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INTRODUCTION
State taxing authority suffers from little of the structural impediments that 
the Constitution imposes on the federal government’s taxing power but the 
states’ power to tax is subject to the restrictions imposed on the exercise of any 
state action by the Constitution.  The most significant obstacles to the states’
assertion of their taxing authority have been the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause.  The Due Process Clause concerns itself with fairness while 
the Commerce Clause concerns itself with a functioning national economy.  
Although the two restrictions have different objectives, for quite some time both 
restrictions shared one attribute—a taxpayer physical presence test.
Business practices evolved in response to technological developments and 
the ability of enterprises to avail themselves of a forum state’s markets with lit-
tle or no traditional physical presence in the state resulted in the elimination of 
the physical presence test for Due Process purposes almost thirty years ago.1
The subsequent exponential growth of electronic commerce finally led to the 
demise of the physical presence test for Commerce Clause purposes as a result 
of the Court’s recent decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair.2 However, a six 
decades old statute remains an impediment to the states’ ability to exercise in-
* J.D. Univ. of PA; Professor of Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA.
1. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); infra notes 29–36.
2. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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come tax jurisdiction over the income earned by remote sellers of tangible per-
sonal property.
In a case unrelated to state taxing authority during the same term, the Court
in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association struck down a federal law 
that prohibited states from authorizing sports gambling. 3 According to the 
Court, the federal law impermissibly commandeered state legislatures.  A criti-
cal holding in that case was that a federal law that prohibits state action is sub-
ject to the anti-commandeering doctrine similar to federal laws that mandate 
state action.  The federal statute that limits the states’ ability to tax is very simi-
lar to the gambling statute that the Court struck down—it prohibits states from 
enacting otherwise permissible legislation without establishing a corresponding 
federal regulatory regime.  In short, the statute commandeers the states similarly 
to the gambling statute.  As a result, the statute is an impermissible encroach-
ment of state sovereignty.
Part I of this Article discusses the Due Process and Commerce Clause limi-
tations on states’ taxing powers and the eventual demise of the physical pres-
ence test as a result of Court’s holdings in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota4 and, 
more recently, South Dakota v. Wayfair. This part also discusses Pub. L. No. 
86-272, the longstanding prohibition imposed on states with regard to the taxa-
tion of income derived by remote sellers of tangible personal property.  Part II 
discusses the anti-commandeering doctrine.  This doctrine has surfaced as a 
significant bulwark for federalism over the past three decades and led to the 
demise of the federal sports gambling legislation as a result of the Court’s re-
cent decision in Murphy.  This part concludes with an analysis of the case and 
its potential application to the tax statute.
I. STATE TAXING POWER
Two centuries ago Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the power to 
tax is a quintessential attribute of state sovereignty notwithstanding that such 
power is not exercisable against the federal government.
[W]e must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on the nature and ex-
tent of this original right of taxation, which is acknowledged to remain with the 
states.  It is admitted, that the power of taxing the people and their property, is es-
sential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on 
the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the government 
may choose to carry it.  The only security against the abuse of this power, is found 
in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon 
its constituents.  This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and op-
pressive taxation.
The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing 
themselves and their property, and as the exigencies of government cannot be lim-
3. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
4. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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ited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the 
interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituent over their repre-
sentative, to guard them against its abuse.  But the means employed by the gov-
ernment of the Union have no such security, nor is the right of a state to tax them 
sustained by the same theory.  Those means are not given by the people of a partic-
ular state, not given by the constituents of the legislature, which claim the right to 
tax them, but by the people of all the states.  They are given by all, for the benefit 
of all—and upon theory, should be subjected to that government only which be-
longs to all.
It may be objected to this definition, that the power of taxation is not con-
fined to the people and property of a state.  It may be exercised upon every object 
brought within its jurisdiction.  This is true.  But to what source do we trace this 
right? It is obvious, that it is an incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive with 
that to which it is an incident.  All subjects over which the sovereign power of a 
state extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, 
upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation.  This proposition may almost 
be pronounced self-evident.
5
In contrast to the federal government’s taxing power, there are few structur-
al impediments to a state’s ability to tax.6 McCulloch v. Maryland prohibited 
the states from imposing taxes on the federal government.7 The Constitution 
prohibits states, with certain exceptions, from imposing imposts and duties on 
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 428-29 (1819). See also Michael T. 
Fatale, Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Preemptions of State 
Tax, MICH. ST. L. REV. 41 (2012) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed. 1961) and THE FEDERALIST NO. 33. (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 
1961)).
6. Congress’s power to tax is expansive, but it is not unlimited. In addition to the constitu-
tional limitations applicable to the exercise of any federal power, there are structural limitations 
specific to the taxing power. Certain taxes must be uniform. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1. The precise 
contours of the uniformity requirement was subject to some debate during the first century of the 
republic but it now refers simply to geographic uniformity—federal tax rates must be the same 
throughout the United States. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-106 (1900). The uniformity re-
quirement rarely surfaces as a point of contention, perhaps due to the political difficulties that would 
be encountered in enacting a provision that overtly disfavored a particular geographic region, but on 
occasion the issue does arise. See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 86 (1983) (stating 
that an exemption from an oil profits tax for certain Alaskan oil did not provide Alaska with an un-
due preference over other states). Congress is prohibited from taxing exports. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 5. Direct taxes must be apportioned among the states according to population. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Note that the Court, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 580-83 
(1895) and Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), held that a tax on income 
derived from real and personal property, respectively, was a direct tax that must be apportioned 
among the several states. The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, authorized the imposition of a 
tax on income from all sources without apportionment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Direct taxes are 
limited to capitation taxes, taxes on real property, and taxes on personal property. See Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012). The Court, in the controversial decision that up-
held the constitutionality of the so-called individual mandate imposed by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, held that Congress has the power to tax inaction despite its inability to regu-
late inaction. See id. at 555–57, 563–70.
7. See McCulloch v. Maryland., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 427–36.
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imports and exports or duties on ship tonnage.8 Otherwise, a state’s power to 
tax is limited by the federal constitutional limitations applicable to the exercise 
of any state government power and the limitations that a state has imposed on 
itself, whether by constitution or statute.
The most significant federal constitutional impediments to the exercise of a 
state’s power to tax are the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Commerce Clause.  The former concerns itself with fair notice and jus-
tice while the latter is primarily concerned with efficient and effective function-
ing of national markets.  However, both limitations implicate nexus issues.
A. Due Process
Due Process limitations on a state’s power to tax are rooted in concepts of 
fair notice and justice applicable to jurisdictional issues in general.  The Court, 
in the seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, held that
due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’
9
According to the Court
to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities with-
in a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exer-
cise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations 
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which 
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most 
instances, hardly be said to be undue.
10
Later cases emphasized that the establishment of minimum contacts by per-
sons within a jurisdiction provides fair warning to such persons that their con-
tacts may subject them to suit in that jurisdiction and provides them with a de-
gree of predictability in which to conduct their affairs.11 The Court also has 
made clear that modern commercial practices have obviated the need for a per-
son to have maintained a physical presence in a jurisdiction in order to satisfy
due process requirements.12 However, the Court, in a relatively recent case, 
noted that the assertion of general jurisdiction by a state is subject to a different 
8. U.S. CONST. art.1, §10, cls. 2–3.
9. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
10. Id. (citations omitted).
11. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); World-Wide 
Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Fair warning is provided if the defendant 
has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum state and the litigation arises out 
of those activities. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. at 774–75. See also Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). See also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 
(1957).
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analysis than the assertion of specific jurisdiction.13 Specific jurisdiction re-
quires a connection between the forum state and the underlying controversy.14
General jurisdiction allows a suit against a defendant in the forum state regard-
less of the cause of action and the defendant’s activities in the forum state.15
With few exceptions general jurisdiction applies to individuals who are domi-
ciled in the forum state or to corporations for which the forum state is fairly re-
garded as their home state.16
In 1967 the Court held that with respect to a state’s exercise of its taxing 
power, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded a state 
from requiring a business with no physical presence in the state to collect and 
pay state sales tax on sales made to persons within the state.17 The petitioner, in 
this case, was a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business was in 
Missouri.18 The petitioner’s Illinois customers placed orders with the petitioner 
in response to semi-annual catalogues and occasional promotional materials 
mailed to customers.19 Orders were fulfilled by shipment via common carrier 
or U.S. mail from a plant in Missouri.20 These shipments and the aforemen-
tioned mailings were the only contacts that the petitioner had with the state of 
Illinois.21 The Court noted the similarity between the due process requirements 
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment that preclude states from asserting ju-
risdiction over persons with insufficient contact with the forum state and the 
prohibition imposed on states by the Commerce Clause that precludes states 
from unduly burdening interstate commerce.22 According to the Court, neither 
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Commerce Clause permitted a state to im-
pose sales tax collection and payment responsibilities on a mail order seller with 
no physical presence in the state.23
National Bellas Hess dealt with a state’s ability to impose sales tax respon-
sibilities on remote sellers, and it did not speak to due process requirements as 
13. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
14. Id. at 919.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). The Court also held 
that the dormant Commerce Clause precludes a state from requiring a business with no physical 
presence from collecting and remitting sales tax to the state. The dormant Commerce Clause, a doc-
trine developed by the Court in the nineteenth century, precludes a state from interfering with inter-
state commerce and arises by implication from Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 
See Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 232 (1873). See also infra notes 55–59 and 
accompanying text.
18. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Rev., 386 U.S. at 753–54.
19. Id. at 753–54.
20. Id. at 754.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 756–58. See infra notes 50-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Commerce Clause.
23. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758–60 at 758–60.
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they may apply to income taxes.  However, less than a decade before the Na-
tional Bellas Hess decision, the Court sanctioned the imposition of an income 
tax by Minnesota and Georgia on corporations whose primary activities within 
the two states were the solicitation of orders for products that were stored in and 
shipped from out of state.24 However, both corporations maintained a very lim-
ited physical presence in the state—a small sales staff and office equipment.25
Although the Court primarily concerned itself with Commerce Clause issues, it 
did address the corporations’ assertions that the income tax imposed on them 
violated due process.
It strains reality to say, in terms of our decisions, that each of the corporations here 
was not sufficiently involved in local events to forge ‘some definite link, some 
minimum connection’ sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. . . . The record 
is without conflict that both corporations engage in substantial income-income pro-
ducing activity in the taxing States.  In fact in No.12 almost half of the corpora-
tion’s income is derived from the taxing state’s sales which are shown to be pro-
moted by vigorous and continuous sales campaigns run through a central office 
located in the State.
26
It is not clear whether the existence of a sales office in the state was critical 
to the Court’s holding or whether the sales office was just another factor that 
established sufficient nexus for the imposition of an income tax.  Apparently, 
Congress believed that the Court sanctioned the imposition of an income tax on 
corporations whose activities in a state amounted to the shipping of products 
from out of state to customers in state because Northwestern States Portland 
Cement was the catalyst for the enactment of Pub. L. No. 86-272.27
The Court had occasion to revisit the physical presence requirement twenty-
five years after National Bellas Hess in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.28 Peti-
tioner was a catalogue retailer of office equipment and supplies whose only 
contact with North Dakota involved the mailing of catalogues and promotional 
materials and the fulfillment of orders from out of state by common carrier or 
U.S mail.29 In that case the Court decoupled the Due Process Clause from the 
Commerce Clause with respect to a state’s power to tax.  Despite the close rela-
tion between the limitations imposed by these two constitutional provisions they 
“pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States.”30 The Due Process 
Clause is concerned with fundamental fairness and the extent that a person’s 
connection with a state legitimizes the state’s exercise of authority over such 
24. Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 453–56 (1959) (consolidat-
ing two cases—one involving Minnesota and the other involving Georgia).
25. Id. at 454–56.
26. Id. at 464–65 (citations omitted).
27. See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
28. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
29. Id. at 302–04.
30. Id. at 305.
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person.31 Its touchstone is notice and fair warning.32 The Court resorted to its 
due process jurisprudence applicable for personal jurisdiction as set forth in In-
ternational Shoe and Burger King v. Rudzewicz.33 The Court noted that its Due 
Process jurisprudence had evolved in the years after its National Bellas Hess
decision and that modern commercial life obviates the need for a physical pres-
ence within a state “‘[s]o long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully 
directed’ toward residents of another State . . . .”’ 34 Accordingly, the wide-
spread solicitation of business within the state by the petitioner created suffi-
cient contacts for the state to impose tax responsibilities on the petitioner under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.35
Quill, like National Bellas Hess, dealt with a state’s sales tax regime.  How-
ever, the Court’s rationale for scuttling a due process physical presence re-
quirement in Quill appears equally applicable to state income tax regimes.  In 
any event, the case law dealing with the taxation of intangible property or the 
income therefrom indicates that a physical presence is not a due process touch-
stone for the imposition of such taxes.
In 1936 the Court, in a case upholding a West Virginia property tax on a 
foreign corporation’s accounts receivable and bank deposits, declared that a 
state could treat intangible assets as located at their owner’s domicile.36 The 
Court went on to acknowledge “. . . that choses in action may acquire a situs for 
taxation other than the domicile of their owner, if they have become integral 
parts of some local business.”37 One year later the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a New York state income tax imposed on a Massachusetts resident 
on the gain from the sale of his seat on the New York Stock Exchange.38 The 
petitioner never carried on any business in New York.39 That same year the 
Court sanctioned the application of Minnesota’s property tax to a Delaware cor-
poration’s stock holdings in banks chartered in Montana and North Dakota.40
According to the Court, the petitioner, by the active exercise of its controlling 
interests in the banks, operated the business of protecting its investments in 
bank shares.41 In rejecting the petitioner’s assertion that subjecting the stock 
31. Id. at 312.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 307.
34. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudze-
wicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
35. Id. However, the Court refused to scuttle the physical presence test for Commerce 
Clause purposes. See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
36. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209 (1936).
37. Id. at 210 (citations omitted).
38. New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
39. Id. at 371.
40. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234 (1937).
41. Id. at 237.
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holdings to tax in Minnesota as well as the banks’ domiciliary states of Montana 
and North Dakota violates due process the Court stated
The resort to a fiction by the attribution of a tax situs to an intangible is only a 
means of symbolizing, without fully revealing, those considerations which are per-
suasive grounds for deciding that a particular place is appropriate for the imposition 
of the tax . . . . But we have recently had occasion to point out that enjoyment by 
the resident of a state of the protection of its laws is inseparable from responsibility 
for sharing the costs of its government, and that a tax measured by the value of 
rights protected is but an equitable method of distributing the burdens of govern-
ment among those who are privileged to enjoy its benefits.  See New York ex rel. 
Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308. The economic advantages realized through the pro-
tection, at the place of domicil[sic], of the ownership of rights in intangibles, the 
value of which is made the measure of the tax, bear a direct relationship to the dis-
tribution of burdens which the tax effects . . . . Like considerations support their 
taxation at their business situs, for it is there that the owner in every practical sense 
invokes and enjoys the protection of the laws, and in consequence realizes the eco-
nomic advantages of his ownership.
42
A leading state court case applied Quill’s due process analysis to a corpo-
rate income tax imposed on a foreign corporation.43 Toys R Us, Inc. transferred 
certain intangible marketing assets to a second tier subsidiary, Geoffrey, Inc., a 
Delaware corporation. 44 The assets, which included trademarks and trade 
names, were licensed to Toys R Us for use in almost all states in exchange for a 
royalty of one percent of net sales by Toys R Us and related entities.45 Toys R 
Us conducted business in South Carolina but Geoffrey conducted no business in 
the state.46 Toys R Us deducted the royalty payment it made to Geoffrey.47
The state initially disallowed the deduction but then reversed its position, al-
lowed the deduction, and took the position that Geoffrey was liable for tax on 
the royalty income it earned from Toys R Us’ sales in South Carolina.48
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the state’s imposition of tax on 
Geoffrey.  The court cited Quill and held that due process is satisfied if the cor-
poration has purposefully directed its activity toward the state regardless of 
whether the corporation had a physical presence in the state.49 Moreover, the 
court, citing to Wheeling Steel and other Court precedents, held that due process 
requirements were satisfied by the presence of Geoffrey’s intangible assets in 
the state—in this case accounts receivable and a franchise.50 The court went on 
to note the benefits conferred by the state on Geoffrey to which the challenged 
42. Id. at 240–41.
43. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16–17.
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tax was rationally related.  “The real source of Geoffrey’s income is not a paper 
agreement, but South Carolina’s Toys R Us customers. By providing an orderly 
society in which Toys R Us conducts business, South Carolina has made it pos-
sible for Geoffrey to earn income pursuant to the royalty agreement.”51
B. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”52 Read literally, the Commerce Clause is a grant of legislative power 
to Congress and nothing more.  Its language does not impose restraints on state 
activities.  The scope of Congress’s legislative power conferred to it by the 
Commerce Clause has long been a subject of debate and the Court’s jurispru-
dence in this area has produced some of its most famous—and consequential—
decisions.
The federal government’s role in the nation’s economic affairs increased in 
response to the industrialization of the economy during the nineteenth century 
and the Progressive movement resulted in the insertion of the public sector in 
theretofore private matters despite the movement’s famous setback in Loch-
ner.53 The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 was the 
genesis of the immense federal bureaucracy with which we are so familiar and 
the Progressive period resulted in the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
the increased regulation of railroads, and the institution of occupational licens-
ing.54
The Supreme Court’s initial resistance to expansive federal powers over 
economic matters, manifested most dramatically in Dagenhart, 55 eventually 
succumbed to the onslaught of New Deal legislation.  The Court’s narrow inter-
pretation of the commerce power came to an end with its decision in the semi-
nal case of N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 56 Any doubts as to the 
51. Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
52. U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 3.
53. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a New York statute regulat-
ing the hours of bakers was an unconstitutional infringement on the right and liberty to contract). 
The Lochner era is considered to have closed with the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), a decision that upheld the constitutionality of Washington state’s min-
imum wage law and overturned an earlier precedent to the contrary, Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
54. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439–66 (2d. ed. 1985).
55. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that compliance with child-labor 
standards was beyond the reach of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce).
56. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 
1935).
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extent of the federal commerce power were laid to rest several years later in 
Wickard v. Filburn.57
Notwithstanding the text of the Commerce Clause, a second application of 
the Commerce Clause placed restraints on state power.  The so-called dormant 
Commerce Clause, a doctrine developed by the Court in the nineteenth century, 
precludes a state from interfering with interstate commerce and arises by impli-
cation from Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 58 Economic 
protectionism was a particular concern of the framers as a result of their experi-
ences with state behavior under the Articles of Confederation.59 A law motivat-
ed by economic protectionism that facially discriminates against out-of-state 
interests or that favors in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests vio-
lates the Commerce Clause unless the state can show that the law in question is 
the only means by which it can advance a legitimate state purpose.60
[N]o state, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may “impose a tax which dis-
criminates against interstate commerce by providing a direct commercial advantage
to a local business.” This antidiscrimination principle “follows inexorably from the 
basic purpose of the Clause” to prohibit the multiplication of preferential trade are-
as destructive of the free commerce anticipated by the Constitution.
61
However, if a law is not motivated by economic protectionism but does affect 
interstate commerce incidentally, the Court has applied a balancing test to de-
termine whether such law is permissible.62
For most of its history the Court applied the dormant Commerce Clause to 
direct burdens imposed by states on interstate commerce.63 In general, states 
were free to regulate production, manufacturing, and mining activities but not 
economic activities that crossed state lines.64 As the economy grew more com-
plex and interconnected, the distinction between interstate and intrastate activi-
ties began to prove unworkable and the Court in two cases reined in the limita-
tions imposed on the states by the dormant Commerce Clause.
As discussed earlier, in Northwest States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota
the Court sanctioned, on due process grounds, a state income tax on income 
57. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce 
includes the power to regulate activity that has an indirect effect on such commerce).
58. See Reading R.R. v. Pa., 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 232 (1873).
59. Michael T. Fatale, The Evolution of Due Process and State Tax Jurisdiction, 55 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 565, 572–73 (2015).
60. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 
(1979).
61. Maryland. v. Louisiana., 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981) (quoting Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 458 (1959), Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 329 (1977), Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 356 (1951)).
62. See generally Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); 
City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm., 432 
U.S. 333 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
63. Fatale, supra note 59, at 574.
64. Id.
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generated from the sale of tangible personal property to customers in Minnesota 
from inventory located outside the state.65 The seller had minimal physical con-
tact with Minnesota.66 In that case, the Court made clear that “a net income tax 
on revenues derived from interstate commerce does not offend constitutional 
limitations upon state interference with such commerce.”67 According to the 
Court, the Minnesota tax was fairly apportioned to reflect the state’s share of 
the company’s income thereby precluding the possibility of multiple taxation 
and was non-discriminatory. 68 The tax, therefore, was not offensive to the 
Commerce Clause.
One year later, the Court, in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, upheld the imposition 
of a use tax collection and remittance obligation imposed on a Georgia corpora-
tion by Florida.69 The corporation’s only connection to Florida was through the 
mails, common carriers, and independent sales agents.70 The Court held that 
whether the sales agents were regular employees or independent contractors is 
“a fine distinction without constitutional significance.”71
As previously discussed, the Court held in National Bellas Hess that both 
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause preclude a state from requir-
ing mail order sellers whose only connection with a state is by the U.S. mails or 
common carrier to collect sales taxes and remit such taxes to the state in ques-
tion.72 The Court distinguished a pure mail order operation from the seller’s
operation in Scripto on the grounds that the latter employed salespersons con-
ducting solicitation activities in the taxing state.73 Three dissenting Justices be-
lieved that the petitioner’s large-scale, systematic, and continuous solicitation of 
the respondent state’s consumer market and its reliance on the state’s credit 
market facilities created sufficient nexus for the respondent to impose tax re-
sponsibilities on the petitioner.74
A decade later the Court obliterated the distinction that it long made be-
tween a tax imposed on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce and a 
tax on net income derived from interstate commerce.  A tax on the former was 
impermissible but not so with regard to the latter.  The Court, after a lengthy 
discussion of the case law that created the distinction, rejected the per se uncon-
stitutionality of a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.75 The 
Court believed that the distinction between a privilege tax and an income tax 
65. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
67. See Northwestern States Portland Cement, 358 U.S. at 454–56.
68. Id. at 462–64.
69. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
70. Id. at 208–09.
71. Id. at 211.
72. 386 U.S. at 753.
73. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 754, 757–58 (1967).
74. See id. at 761–62 (Fortas, Black, Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
75. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278–87 (1977).
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was a matter of semantics and failed to address the problems with which the 
Commerce Clause is concerned.76 In that case the Court also set forth what be-
came known as the Complete Auto test.  A state tax will be upheld if it is ap-
plied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; is fairly appor-
tioned; does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and is fairly related 
to the services provided by the state.77
As discussed above in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court rejected, for 
due process purposes, the physical presence requirement it set forth in National 
Bellas Hess.78 According to the Court, however, the Commerce Clause, in con-
trast to the Due Process Clause, is not concerned with fairness but with “struc-
tural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy.”79
With respect to a state’s taxing power, the Court applied the four part test it es-
tablished in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady and concluded that, for Com-
merce Clause purposes, a person must have a physical presence in the state in 
order for a state to impose tax burdens on that person.80
76. Id. at 289.
77. Id. at 279. One scholar believes that the Complete Auto test shares many similarities with 
the balancing test used by the Court to evaluate the permissibility of non-tax state laws – so called 
Pike balancing. See generally Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 106–08 (2018). The Court recently 
struck down a Maryland tax that failed to provide, for county tax purposes, a credit for taxes paid to 
other states. The Court held that such a tax impermissibly burdened interstate commerce because it 
was not internally consistent—if all states imposed similar taxing schemes out of state businesses 
would bear a higher tax burden than local businesses. See Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787 
(2015). The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) is a model act drafted by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. UDITPA’s prefatory note ex-
plains its rationale.
“The need for a uniform method of division of income for tax purposes among the several 
taxing jurisdictions has been recognized for many years and has long been recommended by 
the Council of State Governments. There is no other practical means of assuring that a tax-
payer is not taxed on more than its net income. At present, the several states have various fo-
rumlae [sic] for determining the amount of income to be taxed, and the differences in the for-
mulae produce inequitable results.”
UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, 3 (1957).
A detailed analysis of the model act is beyond the scope of this work but, in general, the act 
apportions income of multistate business among the states according to the sales, payroll, and prop-
erty located in the states—the so-called three factor formula. The Multistate Tax Compact, an 
agreement developed by a group of state representatives to address multistate tax issues, adopted 
UDITPA and established the Multistate Tax Commission which issued advisory regulations regard-
ing the allocation and apportionment of income. States that impose an income tax have adopted 
some form of apportionment modeled after UDITPA although there are quite a number of variations 
among the states in the methods they deploy to apportion income. See Multistate Tax Compact,
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/The-Commission/Multistate-Tax-Compact (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2020); State Apportionment of Corporate Income, FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS (Jan. 1, 
2019), https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Research/Rates/apport.pdf.
78. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 298.
79. Id. at 312.
80. Id. at 312–18.
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The Court acknowledged that such a bright-line rule may, in certain circum-
stances, be anachronistic but it believed that the benefits of a clear rule out-
weighed its drawbacks.81 Moreover, the retention of a bright-line rule is made 
easier by the fact that Congress is free to overrule the physical presence test.82
The elimination of the physical presence requirement for due process purposes 
opened the door for congressional action with respect to sales taxes on sales by 
remote sellers, whether mail order sellers or online merchants.  As the Court 
pointedly noted, Congress can authorize states to undertake actions that would 
otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause but it has no such power with 
respect to the Due Process Clause.83 Therefore, Quill gave Congress the ability 
to craft a national solution to a growing problem.
C. South Dakota v. Wayfair
At the time of the Quill decision in 1992 the disruptive effect of the internet 
on the economy was unforeseeable to all but the most prescient.  The explosive 
growth of electronic commerce over the next several decades was sure to bring 
the physical presence test into question as an anachronism ill-suited for a mod-
ern economy.  Surprisingly, it took over a quarter of a century for the Court to 
abandon the physical presence test.  Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion in 
Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, signaled that the end of the physical 
presence test was close at hand.84 A few years later the Wayfair decision scut-
tled the physical presence test that insulated remote sellers from state sales tax 
responsibilities.
At issue in Wayfair was a South Dakota statute enacted in 2016 that re-
quired remote sellers to collect and remit sales taxes “as if the seller had a phys-
ical presence in the state.”85 The statute applied to remote sellers who “deliv-
81. Id. at 315–16.
82. See id. at 318.
83. Id. at 305.
84. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
The issue in this case was whether the Tax Injunction Act applied to bar a federal court from enjoin-
ing the state law provision in question. Id. at 4. The Tax Injunction Act precludes lower federal 
courts from interfering with the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). The Court held the Tax Injunction Act did not bar a federal court from en-
joining the enforcement of a Colorado tax law requiring certain retailers to report customers of their 
responsibilities. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. at 4. The Tax Injunction Act was modeled 
after the Anti-Injunction Act, which applies to federal taxes. Id. at 8 (citing Jefferson County v. 
Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434–35 (1999)). The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits, subject to few exceptions, 
any “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . in any court by 
any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” I.R.C. § 
7421(a) (CCH 2019). In effect, this legislation requires that taxpayers resolve their tax disputes in a 
suit for refund and provides legislative notice of the “[g]overnment’s need to assess and collect tax-
es expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference.” See Hibbs v. 
Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
85. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088–89 (2018).
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er[ed] more than $100,000 of goods or services into the [s]tate or engage[d] in 
200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the 
[s]tate” on an annual basis.86 South Dakota sought a declaratory judgment in 
state court against the respondents Wayfair, Inc.; Overstock.com, Inc.; and 
Newegg, none of which had any physical presence in the state. 87 The trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents was affirmed by 
the South Dakota Supreme Court on the ground that Quill remained the control-
ling precedent.88 On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari.89
The Court noted that two principles determine the limits of a state’s authori-
ty to regulate interstate commerce.90 First, states may not enact measures that 
discriminate against interstate commerce and such measures will be subject to 
“a virtual per se rule of invalidity.”91 Second, states may not unduly burden in-
terstate commerce. 92 Whether state measures unduly burden interstate com-
merce is determined by the burdens imposed by the measures in relation to the 
putative benefits generated by those measures.93 The Court then proceeded to 
discuss the four-part test it set forth in Complete Auto for assessing the constitu-
tionality of state taxes.94
The Court had little regard for stare decisis asserting that “Quill is flawed 
on its own terms” for three reasons.95 First, physical presence is not necessary 
for a business to establish “a substantial nexus with [a] taxing state.”96 After 
taking note of modern commercial practices, the Court stated that the nexus re-
quirements for due process and Commerce Clause purposes, albeit not identical, 
contain significant parallels and the reasons given by the Quill Court for reject-
ing the physical presence test for due process purposes apply equally for Com-
merce Clause purposes.97 Moreover, the potential administrative burden creat-
ed by the need to comply with rules of multiple taxing jurisdictions is mitigated 
by advances in software technology.98
86. Id. at 2089.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 735 (2018).
90. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 2090 (2018).
91. Id. at 2091(quoting Granholm v. Heald, 554 U.S. 460, 476 (2005)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
92. Id. at 2091.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
95. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (2018).
96. See id. (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2093.
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Second, the physical presence test, rather than mitigate market distortions, 
in fact creates such distortions.99 Remote sellers have a competitive advantage 
over brick and mortar retailers due to the fact that such remote sellers can offer 
lower prices because they do not charge sales taxes.100 The physical presence 
requirement also creates a disincentive for businesses to establish a physical 
presence in a state.101 Finally, the test is an arbitrary, formalistic distinction –
the type of test that the Court has rejected in its recent Commerce Clause deci-
sions.102
The importance of a state’s taxing power also led the Court to express con-
cerns that Quill undermined federalism principles.103 Stare decisis should not 
be lightly discarded but when
[I]t becomes apparent that the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the 
States from exercising their lawful sovereign powers in our federal system, the 
Court should be vigilant in correcting the error.  While it can be conceded that 
Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, Congress cannot 
change the constitutional default rule.  It is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role 
to ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own crea-
tion.
104
The respondents were found to have a substantial nexus with South Dakota 
by virtue of its economic and virtual contacts with the state.  The Court also 
noted that the statutory safe harbors, the statute’s lack of retroactivity, and the 
fact that South Dakota had adopted measures to reduce compliance burdens ap-
peared to immunize the statute from other dormant Commerce Clause challeng-
es despite the fact that any such challenges were not before the Court.105 The 
99. Id. at 2092.
100. Id. at 2094. Many states have a use tax that requires consumers to pay an amount equal 
to the sales tax on taxable purchases for which the seller has not charged sales tax. However, con-
sumer compliance with use tax rules is notoriously poor. Id. at 2088.
101. Id. at 2094.
102. Id. at 2092.
103. Id. at 2096.
104. Id. The Court noted the changes in the retail landscape that have occurred since it decid-
ed Quill and the difficulties encountered by states in implementing the physical presence test in the 
current environment. See id. at 2097–98. The dissenting Justices agreed that National Bellas Hess
was wrongly decided but believed that the Court should not have overruled it or Quill and that Con-
gress is the appropriate party to discard the physical presences text. See id. at 2101–05 (Roberts, J., 
dissenting).
105. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099–2100. South Dakota adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement, an agreement among member states the purpose of which is to reduce the burdens 
on business of sales tax compliance by, among other measures, requiring state level administration 
of such taxes; severely limiting the ability of states and localities to impose multiple tax rates on 
taxable items; mandating simplified rates, exemptions, and tax returns; and adopting uniform sourc-
ing rules. See STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT (Dec. 18, 2018)
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/agreement/ssuta/ssuta-as-amended-2018-
12-14.pdf?sfvrsn=8a83c020_6.
The agreement was adopted in 2002 and has been amended numerous times. Id. Twenty-four 
states are in full or substantial compliance with the agreement. See State Info, STREAMLINED SALES 
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physical presence test was limited to sales and use taxes but, despite abundant 
case law to the contrary, the test was available by inference to taxpayers to chal-
lenge the imposition of a state income tax.106 Wayfair and its reasoning appears 
to preclude such challenges.107
The Northwestern States Portland Cement decision was the catalyst for the 
enactment of Pub. L. No. 86-272.108 The statute, hastily enacted, was intended 
as a stop-gap measure to protect small companies from punishing state income 
tax compliance burdens.109 Instead, the law benefited larger companies at the 
expense of smaller companies.110 Despite its enactment as a temporary tax re-
lief measure and decades of technologically driven economic change the statute 
is still in force, all the more an anachronism after Wayfair. The statute restricts 
states from exercising their taxing powers in certain circumstances.  Specifical-
ly, the statute provides that
[n]o State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any tax-
able year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the income derived 
within such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only business ac-
tivities within such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year 
are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for
sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for ap-
proval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point 
outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in 
the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by 
TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=state-info (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2020) The South Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged the state’s adoption of the 
agreement in its discussion of the compliance burdens faced by remote sellers subject to sales tax 
collection and remittance obligations. Wayfair, 138 S.Ct. at 2099–2100. Unfortunately, the Court 
did not signal which of the many provisions of the agreement were significant to the Court’s deci-
sion. Consequently, in the absence of a state’s adoption of the agreement, it is unclear what provi-
sions designed to ease administrative burdens are necessary or sufficient. For a summary of the var-
ious state responses to the Wayfair decision See Richard D. Pomp, Wayfair: It’s Implications and 
Missed Opportunities, 58 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 37–44 (2019). See also Editorial, State Tax 
Collectors Want You, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2019, at A16 (reporting and opining on states’ dispar-
ate reactions to the Wayfair decision). Not surprisingly, the states’ exercise of their newfound taxing 
power over remote sellers is disproportionately burdening small business. See Ruth Simon, Web 
Sales-Tax Ruling Jolts Small Business, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2019, at A1.
106. See supra notes 31–48 and accompanying text.
107. See Pomp, supra note 105, at 25–26 (noting that Wells Fargo recorded a state income tax 
expense as a result of the Court’s decision).
108. Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86–272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 381–83 (2019)). See Michael T. Fatale, Federalism and State Business Activity Nexus; 
Revisiting Public Law 86-272, 21 VA. TAX REV. 435, 438–39 (2002). See also supra note 21–24 
and accompanying text.
109. See Fatale, supra note 108, at 437–38.
110. Id. at 438.
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such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from 
such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
111
The statute does not apply to prevent the imposition of state income tax by any 
state on any corporation which is incorporated in such state or to any individual 
who is domiciled in, or a resident of, such state.112 Protected solicitation activi-
ties will not lose their protection because they are performed on behalf of the 
taxpayer by independent contractors.113 The Court has interpreted solicitation 
for purposes of the statute to include activities that are entirely ancillary to re-
quests for purchases and serve no independent purpose apart from their connec-
tion to the soliciting of orders, but activities that are routinely performed by 
salespersons are beyond the scope of the statute.114 The statute’s application to 
“digital goods” is not clear.115 In Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. Director, Div. 
of Taxation, the Tax Court of New Jersey held that a New Jersey Alternative 
Minimum Assessment imposed on gross receipts and whose effect was to co-
erce taxpayers to forego the protection of Pub. L. No. 86-272 was preempted 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.116
In Wayfair the Court finally nodded to economic realities and discarded the 
physical presence test as the imprimatur for states to overcome commerce 
clause objections to their power to tax out of state taxpayers.  The Court had 
discarded the physical presence over a quarter century ago for Due Process pur-
111. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (2019). Moreover, no State, or political subdivision thereof, shall 
have power to assess, after September 14, 1959, any net income tax which was imposed by such 
State or political subdivision, as the case may be, for any taxable year ending on or before such date, 
on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce, if the imposition 
of such tax for a taxable year ending after such date is prohibited by section 381 of this title. 15 
U.S.C. § 382(a) (2019).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 381(b) (1)–(2) (2019).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (2019). An independent contractor is defined as a commission agent, 
broker, or other independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of, 
tangible personal property for more than one principal and who holds himself out as such in the reg-
ular course of his business activities. 15 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (2019).
114. See Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 227–29 (1992). 
The variety of methods in which enterprises conduct business will inevitably raise questions as to 
what activities are or are not protected under the statute. Pennsylvania, for example, has listed nine-
teen activities that are not protected by Pub. L. No. 86-272. PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, CORPORATION 
TAX BULLETIN 2004-01: APPLICATION OF P.L. 86-272 AND DE MINIMIS STANDARDS 2-5 (2004).
115. See Stanley R. Kaminski, Public Law 86-272 and Digital Goods, ST. TAX NOTES 
(NOV. 5, 2018), https://www.duanemorris.com/articles/public_law_86_272_and_digital_goods_
1118.html. At least two commentators believe that the statute is applicable to software and cloud-
based services. See Martin I. Eisenstein & Nathanial A. Bessey, Public Law 86-272: Sunlight for a 
Cloud Service, ST.TAX NOTES, May 21, 2018, at 769, https://www.brannlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/STN-5-21-18-Eisenstein_Bessey.pdf. But see Richard L. Cram, No Shade 
for Cloud Computing Under P.L. 86-272, ST. TAX NOTES, Sept. 24, 2018, at 1237, 
http://www.mtc.gov/getattachment/Uniformity/Uniformity-Committee/2018/Agenda-11-2018/No-
Shade-for-Cloud-Computing-P-L-86-272-Cram.pdf.aspx?lang=en-US.
116. No. 011050-2017, 2019 N.J. Tax Unpub. LEXIS 24 (N.J. Tax Ct. June 28, 2019). See 
infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text for a discussion of preemption.
218 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 9:201
poses.117 In any event, the Court’s limited income tax jurisprudence as well as 
state court decisions regarding the reach of a state’s income taxing power long 
have recognized that economic nexus may be established in myriad ways and 
not all require that the taxpayer be physically present in the forum state.  For six 
decades, however, Congress imposed a statutory limitation on the power of 
states to tax income from the sale of tangible personal property if the seller’s
activities in the forum state did not exceed a statutorily determined line of de-
marcation.  Consequently, in many, if not most cases, any limitation on a state’s 
power to tax remote businesses is statutory, not constitutional.  As a result of a 
completely unrelated case, the enforceability of this statutory limitation may be 
in question.  Shortly after its decision in Wayfair, the Court held the federal 
statutory prohibition on state authorization of sports gambling was unconstitu-
tional on federalism grounds.118 The gambling statute at issue in that cases re-
sembles Pub. L. No. 86-272 in its regulatory approach.  As a consequence, Pub. 
L. No. 86-272 also may violate the Constitution.
II. THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE AFTER MURPHY
In recent years the Court has resurrected the Tenth Amendment as a sub-
stantive limitation on federal power.  One manifestation of this resurrection is 
the Court’s use of the anti-commandeering principle to strike down federal 
laws.  Most recently, the Court used this principle to strike down a federal stat-
ute enacted over a quarter century ago that prohibited states from sanctioning 
sports gambling.  In the process the Court both brought clarity and sowed con-
fusion into the future application of the principle.
A. The Anti-Commandeering Principle – In General
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, the Court 
held that any law that “commandeers the legislative processes of the States by 
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program” ex-
ceeds Congress’s constitutional power.119 Congress, therefore, “lacks the power 
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit” acts which the federal gov-
ernment sees fit to require or prohibit.120 This restriction on federal power, of 
recent vintage and the result of a shift in the Court’s interpretation of the Tenth 
Amendment, is intended to preserve political accountability on federal officials 
117. See supra notes 28–35.
118. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
119. 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
120. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
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by preventing them from making policy choices and shifting responsibility for 
executing such policy choices to state officials.121
The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”122 Chief Justice John Marshall prescient-
ly opined that the issue of the proper allocation of power between the states and 
the federal government “will continue to arise as long as our system shall ex-
ist.”123 In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee the Court held that that state courts are 
bound by Supreme Court decisions and that the Constitution enables the federal 
government to act upon the states.124 The Court restrained Congress’s power 
over state legislatures in later decades, a restraint that continued during the Civil 
War and its immediate aftermath.125
From 1900 to 1937 the Tenth Amendment was a substantive and enforcea-
ble limitation on federal power in contrast to its nineteenth century interpreta-
tion as an admonition that the federal government may exercise only the limited 
powers enumerated in the Constitution.126 The nineteenth century interpretation 
of the Tenth Amendment found favor with the Court after 1937 until the early 
1990s and with one short-lived exception, the allocation of power among the 
federal government and the states was, for the most part, a political issue.127
The Court, holding that the Tenth Amendment prevented the federal gov-
ernment from regulating states in their exercise of traditional government func-
tions, precluded the application of federal minimum wage and overtime pay re-
quirements to state governments in National League of Cities v. Usery.128 Less 
than a decade later the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority and abandoned the traditional gov-
121. Id. at 168. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (striking down pro-
visions that required states to “absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory 
program” and “tak[e] the blame for its . . . defects.” ).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
123. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405 (1819).
124. See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325–28 (1816).
125. See Lane Cty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869); see also Kentucky v. Den-
nison, 65 U.S. 66 (24 How.), 107 (1860); Prigg v. Pennsylvania., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616 (1842).
126. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1636 (2006).
127. See id. at 1636–37. See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (terming 
the Tenth Amendment as merely a “truism”). For decades the Tenth Amendment rarely found its 
way into the Court’s jurisprudence. See Ara B. Gershengorn, Note: Private Party Standing to Raise 
Tenth Amendment Commandeering Challenges, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1068–69 (2000). There 
was one notable exception in the 1970s, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
whose effect proved short-lived. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 499, 505–06 (1995); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543,
558 (1954).
128. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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ernment function test.129 However, the effect of the Garcia decision was blunt-
ed by the Court several years later when it held that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 did not apply to Missouri state judges.130 According 
to the Court a federal statute would not intrude upon fundamental state govern-
ment functions unless Congress clearly intended such intrusion.131
A federal statute that established standards for coal mining operations and 
required states that wanted to assume regulatory authority over such operations 
to enact laws that implemented the standards set forth in the federal statute was 
upheld in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association. 132
Regulatory responsibilities would be assumed by the federal government if a 
state declined to participate.133 The statute did not violate the Constitution be-
cause it did not compel the states to adopt the federal standards, did not require 
them to expend state funds, and did not otherwise coerce them into participation 
in the federal program.134 The Court later stated that Congress could have cho-
sen to preempt the field entirely and that the legislation in question should not 
“become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the 
States a regulatory role.”135 In F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, the Court upheld a fed-
eral law that required state utility commissions to consider the enactment of cer-
tain standards for energy efficiency.136 Because the law did not require the im-
plementation of such standards it was “only one step beyond Hodel.”137
Federal prohibitions on state actions or federal mandates imposed on states 
to enact regulations have been upheld if such prohibitions or mandates merely 
subject a state to the same requirements applicable to private parties or if they 
do not implicate a state’s ability to regulate private parties.  Thus, federal laws 
prohibiting state motor vehicle departments from divulging private information 
about its citizens and prohibiting a state from issuing bonds in bearer form were 
upheld in Reno v. Condon138 and South Carolina v. Baker, respectively.139
129. See generally 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, stated that 
the traditional government function test was not workable because a distinction between traditional 
and non-traditional government functions could not be made in a principled fashion. See id. at 531.
130. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
131. Id. at 460–61.
132. 452 U.S. 264, 271 (1981). The Court in this case reworked the traditional government 
function test it set forth in National League of Cities into a three-part test. A federal statute would be 
unconstitutional if it regulated the states as states, addressed indisputable attributes of state sover-
eignty, or impaired states from structuring integral operations in areas of traditional government 
functions. Id. at 287–88. Four years later the Court abandoned the traditional government function 
test. See Garcia, U.S. at 531.
133. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 272.
134. Id. at 288.
135. Id. at 290.
136. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 746, 769–70 (1982).
137. Id. at 764.
138. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). In Reno, the Court stated that federal law violates that anti-
commandeering principle if it seeks to control or influence the manner in which states regulate pri-
vate parties. Id. at 142. The Third Circuit, in both National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Chris-
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However, in New York v. United States the Court struck down a federal law 
designed to regulate and encourage the orderly disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste.140 The law included a “take-title” provision that mandated a state take 
title to radioactive waste at the request of the waste generator if such state had 
not been able to arrange for the disposal of the waste by a certain time – a pro-
vision that the Court believed “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement 
from coercion.”141 “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative pro-
cesses of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.’”142 Unlike the Articles of Confederation, the Constitu-
tion’s system of dual sovereignty required the federal government to act upon 
individuals and not the states.  “The people, through that instrument, established 
a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample 
power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which 
acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States.”143
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that the federal govern-
ment creates political accountability problems when it masks the source of the 
policy in question by commandeering state legislatures.
If the citizens of New York . . . do not consider that making provision for the dis-
posal of radioactive waste is in their best interest, they may elect state officials who 
share their view . . . . But where the Federal Government directs the States to regu-
late, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from 
the electoral ramifications of their decision.
144
Justice O’Connor noted that the federal government can influence state pol-
icy in a number of ways such as the attachment of conditions to federal funds or 
by threats to preempt the states in a regulatory area if the states do not adhere to 
federal policy—which unlike commandeering, provide states with the choice to 
reject federal overtures.145
tie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 (D. N.J. 2013) and National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of 
New Jerse, 832 F.3d 389, 396–402 (3rd Cir. 2016)(en banc), interpreted Reno to limit the application 
of the anti-commandeering principle to federal laws that require affirmative action from a state. The 
Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and made clear that the principle applies equally to feder-
al commands to states to refrain from action. See infra notes 172, 177, 188–89 and accompanying 
text.
139. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
140. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–54 (1992).
141. Id. at 153–54, 167, 175 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)).
142. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 
288.
143. Id. at 162 (citing Lane Cty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76).
144. Id. at 168–69. For a thoughtful discussion of executive agency preemption and whether 
the courts should afford any deference to agency preemption of state law, see Nina A. Mendelson, A
Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008).
145. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167–68. Hodel and Dole provide examples of 
conditional preemption and conditional spending. See supra text accompanying notes 132–35; infra
text accompanying note 155. Another example of conditional preemption is the requirement im-
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Half a decade later, in Printz v. United States,146 the Court invalidated a 
federal gun control law that imposed requirements on state executive branch of-
ficials.  The Court held that the statute’s requirement that local authorities of 
certain states run background checks on gun purchasers was unconstitutional 
because Congress “may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or en-
force a federal regulatory program.”147 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
rejected the argument that New York limited the application of the anti-
commandeering doctrine to federal commandeering of state legislatures assert-
ing that the distinction between policy-making and policy implementation is of-
ten opaque and that attempts to distinguish between the two would likely prove 
unmanageable.148 Justice Scalia echoed Justice O’Connor’s concerns regarding 
political accountability that she set forth in New York and noted that robust state 
governments help to prevent tyranny.149
posed on the states by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to establish insurance market-
places. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established the American Health Benefit 
Exchanges [hereinafter Exchanges], governmental or non-profit entities that, among other functions, 
serve as insurance marketplaces in which individuals have the ability to comparison shop for insur-
ance products. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311, 124 Stat. 
119, 173-81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2010)). Each state must create and operate 
an Exchange that offers insurance for purchase by individuals and employees of small employers.
Id. § 1311(b). A state may opt out of creating and operating an Exchange in which case the Ex-
change will be established by the federal government. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1321(c), 124 Stat. 119, 186 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18041 
(2010)). A significant issue with respect to the Exchanges was whether federal income tax credits 
were available to low-income purchasers of health insurance on federal Exchanges. The statutory 
language appeared to limit the tax credits to purchasers on state Exchanges, but regulations were 
issued that allowed the credits for purchasers on federal Exchanges. See I.R.C. § 36B (2018); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.36B-1(k) (2012) (defining Exchange by reference to 45 C.F.R. § 155.20); Treas. Reg. § 
1.36B-2(a) (2012) (providing eligibility for credit by enrollment in an Exchange); 45 C.F.R. § 
155.20 (2019) (stating that the term Exchange refers to State Exchanges, regional Exchanges, sub-
sidiary Exchanges, and a Federally-facilitated Exchange) (emphasis added). The limitation of the 
tax credits to purchasers of insurance on state Exchanges would have had a coercive effect on the 
states because failure to establish a state Exchange would have eliminated the possibility that the 
residents of such states could qualify for federal tax credits. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 
(2015). The Court upheld the regulations in King v. Burwell. Id. at 2496.
146. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
147. Id. at 935.
148. Id. at 927–28. Justice Scalia relied on early federal legislation and the Federalist Papers 
to support the Court’s belief that the Constitution was not understood to empower Congress to con-
script state executive branch officials. Id. at 905–11.
149. Id. at 921, 930 (noting that federal commandeering of state officials shifts the cost of 
enforcement to the states). See id. at 930 (recognizing that the shifting of the costs of an activity to 
others—a negative externality—will result in more than an optimal amount of the activity because 
the cost of such an activity is not borne entirely by the person conducting the activity). See general-
ly JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS WITH CALCULUS 598–
603 (2d ed. 2011). It is not clear whether the anti-commandeering principle applies to obligations
imposed on states by treaties. See generally Craig Jackson, The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine and 
Foreign Policy Federalism – The Missing Issue in Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 335 (2008); Janet R. Carter, Note, Commandeering Under the Treaty Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
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The Court, in both New York and Printz, distinguished between Congress’s 
power to commandeer state judges and its power, or lack thereof, to comman-
deer legislative and executive branch officials.  According to the Court, Con-
gress’s power to commandeer state judges is rooted in the Supremacy Clause.150
The notion that the commandeering of state judicial functions is constitutionally 
acceptable was articulated in Testa v. Katt, a case in which the Court held that a 
Rhode Island court was required to adjudicate a claim that arose under federal 
law.151 The contrast in federal power over state judiciaries and such power over 
the other branches of state government had drawn criticism.152
Congress cannot compel state cooperation but, through its spending power, 
it can obtain such cooperation.153 A variety of federal programs dispense an 
enormous amount of funds to the states, often with strings attached.154 Howev-
er, the dangling of federal funds in order to obtain state cooperation has its own 
limits, both constitutional and political.  The conditions under which such an 
exercise of the spending power is constitutionally permissible were set forth by 
the Court in South Dakota v. Dole.155 The federal spending in question must ad-
vance the general welfare, the conditions imposed upon the receipt of funds 
must be stated unambiguously and relate to the federal interests sought to be 
advanced, and such conditional spending cannot be prohibited by another con-
stitutional provision.156 Moreover, financial inducements that are so coercive 
REV. 598 (2001). The court suggesting that some sort of de minimis test may be warranted in de-
termining whether the imposition by the federal government on the states of minor ministerial duties 
is permissible. Justice Scalia stated that the “incidental application to the States of a federal law of 
general applicability” would be constitutionally permissible if such law did not interfere excessively 
with the functioning of the state’s government. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.
150. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178–79; Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
151. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The scope of Congress’s power to require state courts to adjudicate 
federal claims is not clear. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (stating that the Supremacy 
Clause does not necessarily require that a state create a court competent to hear a federal claim); see 
also Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress’s Power to Direct State 
Judicial Action: Congress’s Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State 
Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 649, 675–78 (1999) (discussing various cases and asserting that state courts, 
in the absence of express Congressional direction to the contrary, can invoke neutral rules of juris-
diction to refuse to hear a federal claim).
152. Among the criticisms is that there is no textual basis for making such a distinction 
among the branches of state government. See Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Pow-
er to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 31 IND. L.
REV. 71, 78–90 (1998) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s textual argument set forth in Printz and asserting 
that Article I is the proper source of Congress’s commandeering authority); Evan H. Caminker, 
State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Fed-
eral Law, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1030–1042 (1995) (asserting that the treatment of a state’s ju-
diciary as sui generis is not supported by the text of the Constitution).
153. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
154. See Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American 
Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2015).
155. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
156. Id. at 207–08.
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that they compel states to accept them are impermissible.157 In that case the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act 
which caused a state that did not adopt a legal drinking age of at least twenty-
one to lose five percent of federal highway funds.  According to the Court the 
financial inducement in this case was a form of “relatively minor encourage-
ment” but not coercive.158
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s 
individual health insurance mandate pursuant to Congress’s taxing power. 159
However, the Court ruled against the government on two issues in that case.  
First, it held that the individual health insurance mandate was beyond Con-
gress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.160 Second, it held that the ex-
pansion of Medicaid under the statute impermissibly compelled the states to en-
act or administer a federal program.161 The Court recognized that the federal 
government may offer states inducements to enact or administer programs but 
such inducements become impermissible when “‘pressure turns into compul-
sion”‘ and a state is left with no practical choice but to comply with federal dic-
tates.162 Under the statute, a state that refused to expand its Medicaid program 
faced a loss of all federal Medicaid funding.163 Although in theory a state had 
the option to refuse to expand its Medicaid program as a practical matter, given 
the amount of money at stake, a state had no choice but to expand its Medicaid 
program.
The Court recently had occasion to determine whether Congress has the 
power to prohibit state action in an area in which the federal government has 
chosen not to regulate directly.  The Court’s attempt to distinguish between 
permissible federal preemption of state regulation and the impermissible com-
157. Id. at 211. Precedent is scarce on whether states may accept conditional funding if such 
acceptance would result in the violation of state law. See D. Cody Huffaker, Comment: A New Type 
of Commandeering: The Bypass Clause of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(Stimulus Package), 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1055, 1082 (2010).
158. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
159. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). This was the first case in a trilogy of cases before the Court that 
concerned the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly referred to as “Obamacare”.
In 2014, the Court held that, pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2018), the statute’s requirement that employer provided health insurance in-
clude coverage for certain contraceptives could not be enforced against three closely held corpora-
tions. E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). In 2015, the issue before 
the Court was whether federal tax credits established by the statute were available to qualified indi-
viduals who purchase health insurance on either federal or state exchanges or whether such credits 
were limited to qualified individuals who purchase health insurance only on state exchanges. The 
Court held that the Act makes available tax credits to qualified individuals who purchase health in-
surance on federal exchanges as well as state exchanges. See supra note 141.
160. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 555–58.
161. Id. at 581–85.
162. Id. at 576–80 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 581.
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mandeering of state institutions was not entirely satisfying.  However, the Court 
made clear that the anti-commandeering principle is as applicable to federal 
prohibitions on state action as it is to federal orders for states to take some af-
firmative action.  The statute in question, an anti-gambling measure, operated 
very similarly to Pub. L. No. 86-272.
B.  Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) prohibited 
states from sanctioning the wagering on professional and amateur sports.  
PASPA was enacted in 1992 in response to Congress’s concern about the 
growth of state-sponsored sports gambling, the concomitant erosion of public 
confidence in the integrity of professional and amateur sports contests, and 
skepticism about the assertion that the legalization of sports gambling would 
have a chilling effect on illegal sports gambling.164 The legislation exempted 
Nevada and other states that already had legalized some form of sports gam-
bling.165
PASPA made it unlawful for “a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, 
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact . . . a lottery, sweep-
stakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indi-
rectly . . . on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional 
athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more perfor-
mances of such athletes in such games.”166 Similarly, it was unlawful for a per-
son to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of 
a governmental entity the aforementioned activities.167 Civil actions to enjoin 
violations of the statute could be brought by the Attorney General of the United 
164. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5, 7 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555, 
3558. Congress also believed that state-sanctioned games would increase the incidence of illegal 
gambling. Id. Finally, the statute manifested Congress’s belief that “[t]he moral erosion [sports 
gambling] produces cannot be limited geographically” due to the fact that once sports gambling is 
legalized in a state a race to the bottom would ensue among other states. Id. at 5, as reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556.
165. Id. at 8, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3559. [This citation cannot support the 
statement that “Legislation exempted Nevada . . . .” The Senate Report is not legislation/law.]
166. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2018). A government entity is a state, including territories or posses-
sions of the United States, or political subdivisions thereof, and entities or organizations that have 
governmental authority over territories of the United States, including certain Native American enti-
ties or organizations. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701(2), 3701(5) (2018).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2018). The legislation also exempted certain casino activities. An 
activity otherwise prohibited by the statute was permitted if such activity was not a lottery and was 
conducted exclusively in a casino located in a municipality and such activity or similar activity was 
authorized to be operated in the municipality not later than one year after the effective date of the 
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)(A) (2018). Moreover, any commercial casino gaming scheme oper-
ated by a casino located in a municipality, other than a lottery, was permissible if such scheme was 
in operation in the municipality throughout the ten year period preceding the effective date of the 
statute and is subject to comprehensive state regulation applicable solely to such municipality. 28 
U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)(B) (2018).
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States or by any amateur or professional sports organization whose competitive 
game is the basis of the statutory violation.168
Two general grandfather rules were provided in the statute.  First, lotteries, 
sweepstakes, and betting, gambling and wagering schemes operated in a state or 
other governmental entity at any time between January 1, 1976 and August 31, 
1990 were permitted.169 Second, lotteries, sweepstakes, and other betting, gam-
bling and wagering schemes operated in a state or other governmental entity 
were permitted if such schemes were authorized by statute in effect on October 
2, 1991 and such scheme was actually conducted in the state or other govern-
mental entity at any time between September 1, 1989 and October 2, 1991.170
New Jersey twice challenged the constitutionality of PASPA.  The first 
challenge culminated with the Third Circuit holding that PASPA was constitu-
tional.171 The voters of New Jersey approved, by referendum, an amendment to 
the state’s constitution that permitted the enactment of legislation authorizing 
sports gambling but the legislature failed to meet the deadline set forth in the 
PASPA grandfather provision.172 The National Collegiate Athletic Association 
and various professional sports leagues brought suit to enjoin the state from li-
censing sports betting.173 The state raised three constitutional claims.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2018). An amateur sports organization is any person or governmental 
entity, or league or association of such persons or governmental entities, that sponsors, organizes, 
schedules, or conducts a competitive game in which one or more amateur athletes participate. 28 
U.S.C. § 3701(1) (2018). A professional sports organization is similarly defined except that such 
organization sponsors, organizes, schedules, or conducts a competitive game in which one or more 
professional athletes participate. 28 U.S.C. § 3701(3) (2018).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1) (2018). The Third Circuit interpreted this grandfather rule nar-
rowly in a case involving Delaware’s plan to institute a sports betting scheme in 2009. See Office of 
the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’g 2009 U.S. District LEXIS
69816 (D. Del. 2009). In 2009, Delaware intended to allow single game wagers in professional and 
amateur sports except for sporting events that involved a Delaware college or university or a Dela-
ware amateur or professional sports team. Id. at 296. During the 1976 National Football League 
season, Delaware operated a betting scheme known as “Scoreboard” which required the selection of 
at least three winners in National Football League games. Id. The court held that Delaware’s scheme 
violated PASPA. Id. at 300. The court refused to apply the grandfather rule broadly and held that it 
applied only to schemes that the state had actually conducted in 1976. Id. The schemes did not have 
to be identical in every respect to the games offered in the past but the differences between the pre-
sent and past games must be de minimis and not substantial. Id. at 301–04.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(2) (2018).
171. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013), aff’g
926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D. N.J. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
172. See id.
173. Id. at 214–15. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the state’s
claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a claim and that PASPA was unconstitutional. Id.
at 214–15, 218–24. The requirement of standing is rooted in Article III of the Constitution which 
provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States and . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be party . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The standing requirement also has a prudential dimension.
The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the 
complaining party, even though the court’s judgment may benefit others collaterally. A feder-
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First, the state asserted that PASPA was beyond Congress’s power to regu-
late interstate commerce.  Because both wagering and national sports are eco-
nomic activities and substantially affect interstate commerce, the court dis-
missed this argument. 174 Citing United States v. Lopez, the court held that 
“Congress may regulate an activity that ‘substantially affects interstate com-
merce’ if it ‘arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a commercial transaction.”’175
Second, according to the state PASPA impermissibly commandeered the 
states to enforce a federal regulatory program.  The court rejected this argument 
on the ground that the anti-commandeering principle is inapplicable to federal 
laws that merely prohibit a state from acting in a manner that would violate fed-
eral law.176 PASPA did not require a state to do anything but instead prevented 
a state from doing what the statute prohibits it from doing under the authority of 
the Supremacy Clause.177 A state, for example, could repeal an anti-gambling 
al court’s jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered 
“some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action . . . ” Apart from 
this minimum constitutional mandate, this Court has recognized other limits on the class of 
persons who may invoke the courts’ decisional and remedial powers. First, the Court has held 
that when the asserted harm is a “generalized grievance” shared in substantially equal meas-
ure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of 
jurisdiction . . . . Second, even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the 
“case or controversy” requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally must assert 
his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or in-
terests of third parties . . . . Without such limitations—closely related to Art. III concerns but 
essentially matters of judicial self-governance—the courts would be called upon to decide ab-
stract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may 
be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be un-
necessary to protect individual right. . . . Congress may grant an express right of action to per-
sons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III’s re-
quirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, 
even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants. Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 499–501 (1975).
A discussion of standing jurisprudence, oftentimes bewildering and subject to criticism, is be-
yond the scope of this work. For a cogent analysis and critique of the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
this respect, see Richard E. Epstein, Standing or Spending – The Role of Legal and Equitable Prin-
ciples, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001). See also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citi-
zen Suits, “Injuries”, and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Se-
cure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Taxpayers’
Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
174. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d at 224–25. Moreo-
ver, assuming arguendo that PASPA also reaches purely local activities, such as casual bets among 
family members, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that purely intrastate activity, when 
combined with like conduct by other similarly situated people, affects interstate commerce. Id. at 
225–26 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (other internal citations omitted)). The 
court, in a footnote, did acknowledge Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of 
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), the case that granted professional baseball an exemp-
tion from the Sherman Antitrust Act on the ground that professional baseball is not in interstate 
commerce. See id. at 225 n.7.
175. Christie, 730 F.3d at 224 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
176. See id. at 229–30.
177. Id. at 230–31.
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law so long as the state does not affirmatively authorize or license sports gam-
bling.178 Finally, the court rejected the state’s assertion that PASPA violated 
the equal sovereignty of the states because it singled out Nevada for favorable 
treatment.179
New Jersey’s second challenge was the result of legislation enacted by the 
state in 2014 that repealed certain existing prohibitions the effect of which was 
to permit casinos and racetracks to engage in sports wagering without an ex-
press state authorization.  The Third Circuit held that the law in question violat-
ed PASPA because it channeled sports gambling to particular venues and that 
the allowance of casino sports gambling in the midst of myriad prohibitions of 
sports gambling amounted to state authorization of such gambling.180 For the 
reasons it set forth in the earlier case the court held that the anti-commandeering 
principle was not violated.181
178. Id. at 232.
179. Id. at 237–40. The equal sovereignty doctrine is rooted in Article IV, section 3 of the 
U.S. Constitution and the Tenth Amendment thereto. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2623 (2013); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566–67 (1911). In the Court’s opinion, the state had 
misplaced its reliance on two Supreme Court cases that dealt with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
Christie, 730 F.3d at 237–40 (internal citations omitted). The scope of the equal sovereignty princi-
ple is not clear. On the one hand, the Court has held that the principle is applicable to the terms up-
on which states are admitted to the United States. See S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 
(1966). On the other hand, the Court has signaled that the doctrine may, in fact, have broader appli-
cation. In a 2009 decision involving the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Court stated that “‘[t]he 
doctrine of the equality of States . . . does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subse-
quently appeared.’ But a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a 
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem it tar-
gets.” Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (quoting Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. at 328–29). More recently, in another case involving the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
the Court noted that “Coyle concerned the admission of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the 
notion that the principle operated as a bar on differential treatment outside that context. At the same 
time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains 
highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.” Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2623–
24. According to the Third Circuit, the equal sovereignty principle does not prohibit Congress from 
differentiating among states in the exercise of its commerce power. Christie, 730 F.3d at 238–39. 
Moreover, assuming that the disparate treatment of a state or states has to be justified by unique 
conditions or facts present in the disfavored state or states, PASPA’s grandfather rule still passed 
constitutional muster, because the objective of PASPA was not to eliminate sports gambling but to 
prevent its spread. Christie, 730 F.3d at 239. Finally, if Congress, in fact, was prohibited from fa-
voring Nevada, then the invalidation of the grandfather rule that favors Nevada is the appropriate 
corrective measure rather than the invalidation of the entire statute. Christie, 730 F.3d at 239. Un-
fortunately, the scope of the equal sovereignty principle remains unclear because this issue was not 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 
(2018).
180. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of State of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 396–402 (3d
Cir. 2016) (en banc), aff’g Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 (D.N.J. 
2014).
181. Id. The dissenting judges believed that the repeal of a pre-existing prohibition was not 
tantamount to state authorization and took exception to the majority’s assertion that partial repeal of 
prohibitions may, in some cases, amount to authorization while, in other cases, it may not. Id. at 
402–06 (Fuentes, Restrepo, J.J., dissenting); id. at 406–08 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
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On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that PASPA 
was unconstitutional because it violated the anti-commandeering principle.182
According to the Court, no constitutional distinction should be made between 
federal legislation that commands a state to act and federal legislation that pro-
hibits a state from taking action.183 The Court distinguished federal preemption 
of state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and the impermissible comman-
deering of state authorities.184
The anti-commandeering principle is “the expression of a fundamental
structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i.e., the decision to with-
hold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.”185 Alt-
hough states wield sovereign powers their sovereignty is limited in several 
182. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). Governor Christie’s
name was replaced with that of his successor, Philip D. Murphy. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
dissented, and Justice Breyer dissented in part. Id. at 1488. The Court held that New Jersey’s legis-
lative action fell within the confines of PASPA, because the repeal, in whole or in part, of an exist-
ing statutory prohibition amounts to state authorization of the activity that, prior to repeal, had been 
prohibited. Id. at 1474. The Court held that PASPA was unconstitutional in its entirety because it 
believed that the statutory provision at issue in the case was not severable from the other operative 
provisions of the statute. Id. at 1484–85. The issue before the Court was whether a state may be 
prohibited from authorizing or licensing sports gambling. Id. at 1478. The statute also prohibited a 
state from operating, sponsoring, or promoting sports gambling and the Court held that the prohibi-
tions on these state activities were not severable from the provision at issue in the case and, accord-
ingly, were also constitutionally infirm. Id. at 1482–83. In order for these provisions to fail “it must 
be ‘evident that [Congress] would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, 
independently of [those] which [are] not.’” Id. at 1482 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 
U.S. 678, 684 (1987)). With respect to the prohibition on state sponsorship and promotion activities, 
the Court believed that the distinction between these activities and state authorization, licensing, and 
operation was too uncertain, and that Congress would not have sought to bar such an ill-defined 
category of conduct. Id. at 1483. As a result, the entire operative provision that prohibited various 
types of state action with respect to sports gambling was struck down. In addition to the prohibitions 
the statute imposed on the states, a second operative provision in the statute made it unlawful for a 
person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental 
entity the aforementioned activities. Id. at 1470. This provision was not at issue in the case, but the 
Court proceeded to examine whether this provision was severable from the provision at issue and 
held it was not severable. Id. at 1483–84. The Court also struck down the statute’s prohibitions on 
both states and private actors from advertising sports gambling operations. Id. at 1484. The Court 
relied heavily of First Amendment principles as set forth in several of its precedents with respect to 
the advertisement of legal activities. See id. Justice Thomas’ concurrence invited the Court to revisit 
its jurisprudence with respect to severability asserting that severability analysis has devolved into 
the advancement of judicial policy preferences and that parties often lack standing to challenge the 
provisions to which severability analysis is applied thereby inviting the courts to issue advisory 
opinions. See id. at 1485–87 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented 
because they believed that the statute’s various prohibitions on states, other than those that prohibit-
ed states from authorizing and licensing sports gambling, were severable from the prohibitions in 
question as were the statute’s prohibitions on private actors. Id. at 1489–90 (Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
J.J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also believed that the provisions applicable to private parties were 
severable from those operative on the states. Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).
183. See infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 191–99 and accompanying text.
185. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475.
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ways.  For example, certain grants of power to the federal government impose 
implicit restrictions on state governments and the Supremacy Clause preempts 
state law when such law conflicts with federal law that is within the scope of the 
authority granted to Congress by the Constitution.186 The federal government 
may act only within the enumerated powers conferred upon it and all other leg-
islative power is reserved to the states.187 The anti-commandeering principle 
“simply represents the recognition of this limit on congressional authority.”188
Citing to New York v. United States, Justice Alito stated that the Constitu-
tion, in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, grants Congress legislative au-
thority over individuals and not the states and that “‘even a particularly strong 
federal interest’” would not enable Congress to command a state to enact regu-
lation.189 “Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to 
legislate it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its 
agents.”190 The anti-commandeering principle serves several important purpos-
es, including the promotion of political accountability, the reduction of the risk 
of tyranny by maintenance of a balance of power between the states and the 
federal government, and prevention of enforcement cost shifting to the states.191
According to the Court, the prohibition on states from authorizing sports 
gambling, dictates to a state legislature what it may or may not do and, in effect, 
puts such legislature under the direct control of Congress.192 The Court pro-
ceeded to dispel the notion that a distinction should be made between a congres-
sional command to act and command to refrain from action.
This distinction is empty.  It was a matter of happenstance that the laws challenged 
in New York and Printz commanded “affirmative” action as opposed to imposing a 
prohibition.  The basic principle – that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state 
legislatures – applies in either event. . . .  Suppose Congress ordered States with le-
galized sports betting to take the affirmative step of criminalizing that activity and 
ordered the remaining States to retain their laws prohibiting sports betting.  There is 
no good reason why the former would intrude more deeply on state sovereignty 
than the latter.
193
The Court then proceeded to distinguish the statute in question from con-
gressional actions that the Court had previously upheld.  In those cases, Con-
gress either exerted pressure on states to act in accordance with congressional 
objectives, regulated states similarly to private actors in an activity in which 
186. Id. at 1475–76 (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008); Am. Ins. 
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992)).
190. Id. at 1477 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992)).
191. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69, 181–82 (1992); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929–30 (1997)).
192. Id. at 1478.
193. Id.
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both engage, provided states with a choice to act or not act, or merely required 
states to consider, but not necessarily adopt, a federal regulatory scheme.194
The Court’s holding that the federal government can no more order a state 
to do nothing than it can order a state to do something calls into question how 
the anti-commandeering principle is distinct from preemption.
The Court noted that federal preemption of state law is warranted when fed-
eral law confers rights or imposes restrictions on private actors and state law 
confers conflicting rights or imposes conflicting restrictions.  According to the 
Court, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett provided an example of conflict
preemption, the preemption of a state law that imposes a duty or confers a right 
that is conflict with federal law.195 In that case, the Court struck down a state 
law that required a generic drug manufacturer to provide information on a ge-
neric drug label in addition to the information required by the F.D.A.196 The 
state law in question conflicted with federal law because federal law prohibited 
generic drug manufacturers from altering the composition of an F.D.A. ap-
proved drug or the F.D.A. approved label.197
Federal laws that preclude state action—laws that appear strikingly similar 
to PASPA—implicate “express preemption.”  States or their political subdivi-
sions are prohibited from enacting or enforcing any law, rule, regulation, stand-
ard, or provision having the force and effect of law related to air carriers rates, 
routes, or services by a  provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.198
According to the Court, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 conferred on pri-
vate actors, in this case airlines, a federal right to engage in certain conduct free 
of state law constraints and this right distinguished this provision from the 
PASPA provision at issue despite the fact that this provision operated directly 
on the states.
The federal law that governs the registration of aliens offers an example of 
“field” preemption—when federal law occupies an area of regulation “‘so com-
prehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation.’”199
Federal law provides aliens with a right to be free of any registration obligation 
other than those required by federal law.200 Consequently, field preemption, 
194. Id. at 1478–79 (discussing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), Reno v. Con-
don, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), 
and FERC  v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 752 (1982)). For a discussion of several of these cases see supra
notes 129–35 and accompanying text. Note that federal laws that incentivize states to act in a certain 
manner are susceptible to challenge if the incentive structure embedded in the legislation is coer-
cive. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
195. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
196. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013).
197. Id. at 480–86.
198. Id. at 1481 (first citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) then 
citing 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1)(1988)).
199. Id. at 1490–81 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012); R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, (1986)).
200. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012).
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notwithstanding that it directly precludes state governments from acting, is 
predicated, like conflict and express preemption, on federal law that regulated 
private actors and not states.201
According to the Court, PASPA cannot be interpreted as regulating private 
actors and, consequently, is not a preemption provision.202 PASPA’s operative 
provision at issue neither conferred federal rights on anyone who desired to
conduct sports gambling operations nor imposed any restrictions on private ac-
tors and, therefore, it can only be interpreted as a direct command to the states 
in violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine.203
C. Analysis of Murphy and its Potential Impact on Pub. L. No. 86-272
A variety of criticisms have been directed toward the anti-commandeering 
principle.204 However, unless and until the Court is swayed by its critics the an-
ti-commandeering principle is a judicial tool available in the enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment.
Two significant principles emerged from the Court’s decision in Murphy.
First, the distinction between permissible preemption of state action and imper-
missible commandeering of state authorities is premised on whether the federal 
law at issue confers rights or imposes restrictions on private actors.205 If such 
rights are conferred or such restrictions imposed then state action may be 
preempted by federal law.  Otherwise, preemption will not provide constitution-
al cover against state claims of impermissible commandeering by the federal 
government.  In the Court’s opinion, PASPA directly regulated states.206 The 
Court’s reasoning is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, private parties indisputably are regulated by a second operative provi-
sion of PASPA, a provision that makes it unlawful for a person to sponsor, op-
erate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental 
201. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
202. Id.
203. Id. The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that the prohibition on licensing sports 
gambling should be upheld. The federal government’s power to restrict a state from licensing an 
operation is subject to the same constraints as its power to restrict a state from authorizing an activi-
ty. Id. at 1481–82.
204. Some critics of the principle assert that political accountability, a value that the principle 
supports, has no textual support in the Constitution. See Siegel, supra note 126, at 1632; Coan, su-
pra note 154, at 13. Moreover, the notion that cooperative federalism supports political accountabil-
ity is devoid of empirical support and is premised on Panglosian notions of voter competence. See 
Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L. J. 1104, 1112–71 
(2013). Critics have also posited that the framers intended the federal government to enlist state of-
ficials in carrying out federal policies, that conditional spending and preemption either function sim-
ilarly to commandeering or are more damaging to federalism principles because they eliminate any 
role for states in policy making. See Siegel, supra note 126, at 1646–57; Caminker, supra note 152, 
at 1084–85; Coan, supra note 154, at 15–16.
205. See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
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entity certain sports gambling activities.207 Second, the Court contrasted Mur-
phy with cases in which it held federal legislation preempted states from regu-
lating airline fares and immigration documentation.208 In those cases the Court 
believed that the preemptive effect of federal law was justified despite the fact 
that the states were told what they could not do because the laws in question 
provided rights to private actors  However, it is difficult to ascertain why the 
PASPA provision in question did not confer on the professional sports leagues 
and the National Collegiate Athletic Association the right to conduct their af-
fairs free of any state sanctioned activity to which they are opposed and why 
such  a right is not as cognizable as the right to set airfares free of state interfer-
ence or the right to register one’s immigration status with a single government 
agency.
PASPA did not create an independent federal legal framework for the activ-
ity it sought to regulate and an argument can be made that, absent a separate and 
distinct federal legal framework, preemption is inapt because there is no federal 
legal framework for state action to disturb and thereby support federal preemp-
tion claims.  The Court did not draw this distinction between PASPA and the 
other statutes.  Consequently, the line between commandeering and preemption 
is not so clear.
Second, the Court held that the anti-commandeering principle is applicable 
to federal commands that prohibit state action in addition to commands that 
compel state action.209 Thus Murphy calls into question whether the federal 
government can compel states to refrain from enacting measures that they oth-
erwise are entitled to enact.
Pub. L. No. 86-272 has several attributes in common with PASPA.  PASPA 
did not provide a federal regulatory regime to govern sports gambling.  Instead, 
it merely prohibited the states from taking action that they otherwise were per-
mitted to take.210 The Court’s explanation of why PASPA did not preempt state 
law was unsatisfactory.211 The fact that the federal law in question did not pro-
vide the federal government with any direct regulatory role in the subject area 
may have swung the Court against preemption and toward the anti-
commandeering doctrine—the Court did not say.  However, common sense in-
dicates that a state law whose provisions do not conflict with federal law but for 
the fact that federal law prohibited the state from enacting the law is not suscep-
tible to preemption.  Public Law No. 86-272, like PASPA, contains no substan-
tive regulatory provisions.  Instead, it operates similarly to PASPA—it simply 
207. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. Although the Court did note the existence of 
this provision it did not discuss it in the context of preemption but instead it discussed this provision 
only in the context of its severability from the operative provision at issue. See supra note 176 and 
accompanying text .
208. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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prohibits states from enacting certain legislation that is otherwise within their 
power to enact.
When Pub. L. No. 86-272 was enacted, there may have been some doubt 
about the extent of a state’s power to tax income derived by out of state sellers 
whose physical contacts with the forum state were minimal.  The physical pres-
ence test survived for Due Process purposes until 1992 and the Court finally put 
the test to rest for Commerce Clause purposes in Wayfair.212 Arguably, based 
on the case law prior to Wayfair, states had the power to tax income derived by 
out of state sellers whose contacts with the forum state involved availing them-
selves of the market in question, whether electronically or through mass me-
dia.213 Wayfair is confirmation that modern commercial practices have given 
constitutional imprimatur to the states to expand the reach of their taxing pow-
ers to businesses that at one time enjoyed the protection of the physical presence 
test.  Given that states have the sovereign power to impose taxes on income de-
rived from sales subject to Pub. L. No. 86-272, the statute is nothing more than 
a command to the states to scale back the reach of their income taxes.
CONCLUSION
As the Court made clear in Murphy a federal command that prohibits state 
action is subject to anti-commandeering scrutiny no less so than a federal com-
mand for a state to act.214 Moreover, Pub. L. No. 86-272 implicates a state’s
power to tax, a central attribute of state sovereignty.215 It would be inconceiva-
ble that the federal government can mandate that states eliminate their corporate 
income tax because corporate compliance with myriad state tax codes is ineffi-
cient and, thus, burdens interstate commerce. Pub. L. No. 86-272 prevents a 
state from the legitimate exercise of its taxing power to avoid impediments to 
interstate commerce.  The law is anachronistic, enacted at a time when com-
mercial practices little resemble those of today.  Moreover, its application only 
to the sale of tangible personal property further evidences its agedness.  The ex-
tent of its application to digital goods is not clear and it does not apply to the 
rendering of services by remote out of state service providers.  The notion that 
the measure is needed to allow for the efficient functioning of the interstate 
market is belied by the fact service activities have not appeared to suffer with-
out a federally imposed tax exemption.  Regardless of the statute’s policy pros 
and cons Murphy has provided the legal grounds for eliminating a six-decade 
old federal encroachment on states’ taxing powers.
212. See supra notes 25–32, 82–99 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 21–48 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
